Local differential privacy is a widely studied restriction on distributed algorithms that collect aggregates about sensitive user data, and is now deployed in several large systems. We initiate a systematic study of a fundamental limitation of locally differentially private protocols: they are highly vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. While any algorithm can be manipulated by adversaries who lie about their inputs, we show that any non-interactive locally differentially private protocol can be manipulated to a much greater extent. Namely, when the privacy level is high or the input domain is large, an attacker who controls a small fraction of the users in the protocol can completely obscure the distribution of the users' inputs. We also show that existing protocols differ greatly in their resistance to manipulation, even when they offer the same accuracy guarantee with honest execution. Our results suggest caution when deploying local differential privacy and reinforce the importance of efficient cryptographic techniques for emulating mechanisms from central differential privacy in distributed settings.
Introduction
Many companies rely on aggregates and models computed on sensitive user data. The past few years have seen a wave of deployments of systems for collecting sensitive user data via local differential privacy [EGS03] , notably Google's RAPPOR [EPK14] and Apple's deployment in iOS [App17] . These protocols satisfy differential privacy [DMNS06] , a widely studied restriction that limits the information leaked due to any one user's presence in the data. Furthermore, the privacy guarantee is enforced locally, by a user's device, without reliance on the correctness of other parts of the system.
Local differential privacy is attractive for deployments for several reasons. The trust assumptions are relatively weak and easily explainable to novice users. In contrast to centralized differential privacy, the data collector never collects raw data, which reduces the legal, ethical, and technical burden of safeguarding the data. Moreover, local protocols are typically simple and highly efficient in terms of communication and computation. Despite these benefits, local protocols have significant limitations when compared to private algorithms in the central model, in which data are collected and processed by a trusted curator. The most discussed limitation is larger error for the same level of privacy (e.g., [DMNS06, KLN + 08, BNO11]). In this paper, we initiate a systematic study of a different limitation that we show to be equally fundamental:
Locally differentially private protocols are highly vulnerable to manipulation.
While any algorithm can be manipulated by users who lie about their data, we demonstrate that local algorithms can be manipulated to a far greater extent. As the level of privacy or the size of the input domain increase, an adversary who corrupts a vanishing fraction of the users can effectively prevent the protocol from collecting any useful information about the data of the honest users. This result can be interpreted as showing that local differential privacy opens up new, more powerful avenues for poisoning attacks-poisoning the private messages can be far more destructive than poisoning the data itself.
Prior work had already noted that a specific protocol-Warner's randomized response [War65] is vulnerable to manipulation [AJL04, MN06] . In contrast, our work shows that manipulation is unavoidable for any noninteractive local protocol that solves any one of a few basic problems to sufficiently high accuracy, and systematically study the optimal degree of manipulation of local protocols for each problem. These problems capture computing means and histograms, identifying heavy-hitters, and estimating the distribution of users' data. We also show that existing protocols differ greatly in their vulnerability to manipulation.
Our results suggest caution when deploying locally differentially private protocols. If manipulation is a potential concern, then there should be mechanisms for enforcing the correctness of users' randomization (for instance, via software attestation). Our results also reinforce the importance of efficient cryptographic techniques that emulate central-model algorithms in a distributed setting, such as multiparty computation [DKM + 06] or shuffling [BEM + 17, CSU + 19]. Such protocols already have significant accuracy benefits, and our results highlight their much higher resilience to manipulation.
Why are Local Protocols Vulnerable to Manipulation? Intuitively, because local differential privacy requires that each user's message is almost independent of their data, large changes in the users' data induce only small changes in the distribution of the messages. As a result, the aggregator must be highly sensitive to small changes in the distribution of messages. That is, an adversary who can cause small changes in the distribution of messages can make the messages appear as if they came from users with very different data, forcing the aggregator to change its output dramatically.
We can see how this occurs using the classic example of randomized response. Here each user's has data x i ∈ {±1}. For roughly 2ε-local differential privacy, each user outputs
2 −x i with probability 1−ε 2 so that the expectation of y i is εx i . The aggregator can compute an unbiased estimate of the mean 1 n n i=1 x i by returning 1 n n i=1 y i ε . In order to extract the relatively weak signal and make the estimate unbiased, the aggregator scales up each message y i by a factor of 1 ε , which increases the influence of each message. Specifically, an adversary who can flip m of the messages y i from −1 to +1 will increase the aggregator's output by 2m εn . A simple consequence of our work is that any noninteractive LDP protocol for computing the average of bits is similarly vulnerable to manipulation.
A Representative Example: Frequency Estimation
We can more fully illustrate our work results through the example of frequency estimation. Consider a protocol whose goal is to collect the frequency of words typed by users on their keyboard. We assume that there are n users, and each user contributes only a single word to the dataset, so each user's word is an element of [d] = {1, . . . , d} where d is the size of the dictionary. The goal of the protocol to estimate the vector consisting of the frequency of each word as accurately as possible. In this example, we measure accuracy in the 1 norm (or, equivalently, in statistical distance or total variation distance): if v ∈ R d is the frequency vector whose entries v j are the fraction of users whose data takes the value j, andv is the estimated frequency vector, then the error is v −v 1 = d j=1 |v j −v j |. We consider a general attack model where the adversary is able to corrupt a set of m out of the n users' devices, and can instruct these users to send arbitrary messages, possibly in a coordinated fashion. The corruptions are unknown to the aggregator running the protocol to prevent the aggregator from ignoring the messages of the corrupted users. In this, and all of our examples, the adversary's goal is to make the error as large as possible-exactly opposite to goal of the protocol.
Baseline Attacks. In order for the attack to be a concern, the adversary has to be able to introduce more error than what would otherwise exist in the protocol, and the attack should be specific to local differential privacy. In particular, we say the attack is non-trivial if it introduces more error than the following trivial baselines:
No Manipulation. The adversary could choose not to manipulate the messages at all, in which case the protocol will still incur some error due to the fact that it must ensure local differential privacy. For example, it is known that an optimal ε-differentially private local protocol for frequency estimation introduces error ≈ d 2 /ε 2 n [DJW13a] .
Input Manipulation. The adversary could have the corrupted users change only their inputs. That is, the corrupted users could honestly carry out the protocol as if their data were some arbitrary x i instead of x i (see Figure 3 ). Since the corrupted users control an m/n fraction of the data, they can skew the overall distribution by m/n. This attack applies to any protocol, private or not. These baselines make sense in the context of any task, and we will use the bounds for these baselines to calibrate the effectiveness of attacks for other problems (not just frequency estimation) in the next section.
Our Manipulation Attack. In Section 4, we describe and analyze an attack that skews the overall distribution by ≈ m √ d εn , for any noninteractive ε-differentially private local protocol. This attack introduces much larger error-by roughly a factor of √ d ε -than input manipulation, and thus shows specifically that locally private protocols are highly vulnerable to manipulation. Moreover, when the adversary corrupts m ≈ √ nd (which is much smaller than n for any interesting choice of n and d) users, then they can significant reduce the accuracy of the protocol. We can also show that our attack is near-optimal by demonstrating that achieves optimal error in the absence of manipulation, and cannot be manipulated by more than ≈ m √ d εn . The Breakdown Point. Another way to understand the effectiveness of a manipulation attack is through what we call the breakdown point-the maximum fraction of corrupted users that any protocol can tolerate while still ensuring non-trivial accuracy. Our attack demonstrates that, for frequency estimation, the breakdown point is roughly ε √ d . That is, that this number of corrupted users can skew the distribution by Ω(1) in 1 norm, while any two frequency vectors have 1 distance at most 1. Thus, when ε is small or d is large, an attacker who controls just a vanishing fraction of the users can prevent the protocol from achieving any non-trivial accuracy guarantee.
Summary of Results
In this work, we construct two manipulation attacks on locally differentially private protocols, and use these attacks to derive lower bounds on the degree of manipulation allowed by local protocols for a variety of tasks (including the frequency estimation example above). We also study the resilience of specific protocols to manipulation. For each problem, we give a protocol that is asymtpotically optimal with respect to both ordinary accuracy (i.e., without manipulation) and resilience to manipulation. We also show that popular protocols for most tasks are much less resistant to manipulation than optimal ones. Below, we first discuss the attacks informally, and then discuss the set of problems to which they apply. We defer details of the attack model to Section 2.2. Our results are summarized in Table 1 .
Manipulation Attacks for Binary Data. Our first attack concerns the simplest problem in local differential privacy-computing a mean of bits. Each user has data x i ∈ {0, 1}, and we assume that each x i is drawn independently from the Bernoulli distribution Ber(p), meaning x i = 1 with probability p and x i = 0 with probability 1 − p. Our goal is to estimate the mean p as accurately as possible. More generally, we could allow the users to have arbitrary data x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ {0, 1} and try to estimate 1 n n i=1 x i . For the purposes of attacks, considering the former distributional version will make our results stronger.
Without manipulation, this problem is solved by the classical randomized response protocol [War65] , which achieves optimal error Θ( 1 ε √ n ). As we discussed in the introduction, one can show that the error of randomized response increases to Θ( 1 ε √ n + m εn ) when an adversary corrupts m of the users. We show that no protocol can improve this bound.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). For every ε-differentially private local protocol Π for n users with input domain {0, 1}, there is an attack M corrupting m users such that Π cannot distinguish between the following cases:
1. The data is drawn from Ber(p 0 ) for p 0 = 1 2 and Π has been manipulated by M .
2. The data is drawn from Ber(p 1 ) for p 1 = 1 2 + Θ( 1 ε ( 1 √ n + m n )) and Π has not been manipulated.
This theorem shows that, when the data is drawn from Ber(p) for unknown p, no protocol Π can estimate p and guarantee accuracy better than Θ( 1 ε √ n + m εn ). As an immediate consequence, when the data x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ {0, 1} may be arbitrary, no protocol Π can estimate the mean 1 n i x i with higher accuracy.
Manipulation Attacks for Large Domains. Since estimating the mean of bits is a special case of most problem studied in the local model, this attack already shows that manipulation can cause additional error of Ω( m εn ) for many problems. In some cases, this bound is already near-optimal, and some protocol achieves a similar upper bound. However, for many cases of interest (such as the frequency estimation example), protocols become more vulnerable to manipulation when the size of the input domain increases. Our second result is an attack on any protocol accepting inputs from the domain [ For a large class of natural protocols, the bound on U − P 1 can be sharpened to Θ(
. A consequence of this attack for the example of frequency estimation above is that any local protocol can have the distribution skewed byΩ( m √ d εn ). As we show in Section 5, this bound is actually matched by a simple protocol.
Applications. We consider a variety of tasks of interest in local differential privacy, and show that for each of them, one of the two attacks above gives an optimal bound on how vulnerable protocols for that task are to manipulation. The results are summarized in Table 1 .
Most tasks we consider can be formulated as instances of the following p / q -mean estimation problem for vectors in R d . 1 Each user's data x i is a vector in R d such that the p -norm of each data point is bounded, x i p ≤ 1. The protocol's goal is to output an estimate of the meanμ with low error in the q -norm, μ − 1 n n i=1 x i q . This setup captures a number of widely studied problems: • The frequency estimation example above is a special case of 1 / 1 estimation, where each user represents their word x i ∈ [d] by the standard basis vector e x i ∈ R d with a 1 in the x i -th coordinate and 0 elsewhere.
• Computing a histogram of data in [d] is a special case of 1 / ∞ -mean estimation. The heavyhitters (HH) problem, which asks one only to identify the heaviest bins of a histogram and their frequencies, suffices to solve 1 / ∞ -mean estimation, so manipulation attacks on the latter thus imply attacks on the former. Computing heavy-hitters has been a focal point in the past few years [HKR12, BS15, BNST17, BNS18], and it is central to systems deployed by Google and Apple [EPK14, App17] .
• Computing the answers to d statistical queries [Kea93, BDMN05, KLN + 08] is a special case of ∞ / ∞ -mean estimation. Users have data in some arbitrary domain X , there are d query functions f 1 , . . . , f d : X → [−1, 1], and we would like an accurate estimate of n i=1 f j (x i ) for every j. In the corresponding mean estimation instance, x i = (f 1 (x i ), . . . , f d (x i )).
• When minimizing a sum of convex functions f (θ) = n i=1 f x i (θ) defined by the users' data (e.g. to train a machine learning model), one often computes the average gradient n i=1 ∇f x i (θ t ) at a sequence of points θ t . Typically one assumes that the gradients are bounded in 2 , and convergence requires an accurate estimate in 2 , making this an instance of 2 / 2 -mean estimation. (More generally, optimization requires this sort of estimation [BST14] ).
Problem
No Manip. Manip. UB Manip. LB Breakdown Point
Thm 5.7 Thm 4.9
Thm 5.9 Thm 4.8
Thm 5.10 Thm 3.7
[Folklore] Thm 5.2 Thm 3.7
Thm 5.8 Thm 3.7 Table 1 : Summary of Results. In each case, [No Manipulation] is the optimal error achievable under local differential privacy without manipulation. For each problem, we identify some protocol that has optimal error without manipulation such that manipulation can increase the error by [Manipulation UB] and show that manipulation can make the error of any local protocol as large as [Manipulation LB]. Finally, in each case, no protocol can guarantee non-trivial accuracy in the presence of [Breakdown Point] corrupted users. indicates that the upper bound limited to public-string-oblivious attacks. indicates that the √ log n factor can be removed for a natural class of protocols. In all cases, lying about m inputs ("input manipulation") influences the correct output by m n ; we present the upper and lower bounds as multiples of that baseline.
• We consider one further problem, 1 / 1 -uniformity testing, for which Acharya et al. [ACFT19] considered LDP protocols. Assuming the data is drawn from some distribution over [d] , we want to determine if this distribution is either uniform or is far from uniform in 1 distance.
Since every p / q mean estimation problem generalizes binary mean estimation (the special case where d = 1), our first attack gives a lower bound on all of these problems. Our second attack is precisely an attack on the 1 / 1 -testing problem, and thus implies a lower bound ofΩ( m √ d εn ) for that problem. Finally, since 1 / 1 -mean estimation problem strictly generalizes 1 / 1 -testing problemonce we estimate the mean, we can determine if it is close to uniform or far from uniform-we obtain the same lower bound for that problem.
Resilient Protocols For all of these problems we also identify and analyze protocols whose error nearly matches the lower bounds established by our attacks. These protocols generally use the public-coin model to compress each player's report to a single bit, thus reducing their influence.
While all of our optimal protocols were known prior to our work, we demonstrate that the choice of protocol is crucial. Some well known protocols with optimal accuracy absent manipulation allow for much greater manipulation than necessary. For example, the simplest adaptation of randomized response to frequency estimation, in which each player sends one bit per potential item, allows m corrupted users to introduce error about md/ n in a direction of their choice, which is about √ d larger than optimal.
Related Work
Prior work had already observed that the specific randomized response protocol was vulnerable to manipulation [AJL04, MN06] . In contrast to ours, these works constructed efficient cryptographic protocols for sampling from the correct distribution, which resist our attacks. Our work shows that some degree of cryptography is necessary to avoid manipulation.
Our work is loosely related to data poisoning attacks in adversarial machine learning. In data poisoning, the adversary is inserts additional data to somehow degrade the quality of the output. Our attacks can be viewed as data poisoning attacks where the "data" being poisoned is actually the messages to the protocol. Thus, our results can be viewed as showing that adding local randomization to achieve privacy makes the protocol much more vulnerable to data poisoning.
Our work is also related to the literature on robust statistics. In the standard model of robust statistics, we are given data drawn from distribution P with some structure (e.g. P is a Gaussian distribution), but some small fraction of the data has been corrupted with arbitrary data, and the goal to identify the distribution P as well as possible. Our setting is similar except that we don't get access to the data directly, but only once its been filtered through some set of private local randomizers. One might hope to obtain local protocols that are robust to manipulation using techniques from robust statistical estimators on the distribution of messages induced by the local randomizers. Our attacks can be viewed as showing that such robust estimators don't exist.
Organization
In Section 2 we introduce the model and key concepts. In Section 3, we demonstrate attacks on protocols for binary data, and in Section 4, we demonstrate attacks on protocols for large data domains. In Section 5 we identify protocols with near-optimal resistance to manipulation for a variety of canonical problems in local differential privacy. In Section 6 we highlight the fact that not all protocols with optimal error absent manipulation are optimally robust to manipulation.
Threat Model and Preliminaries

Local Differential Privacy
In this model there are n users, and each user i ∈ [n] holds some sensitive data x i ∈ X belonging to some data universe X . There is also a public random string S. Finally there is a single aggregator who would like to compute some function of the users' data x 1 , . . . , x n . In this work, for simplicity, we restrict attention to non-interactive local differential privacy, meaning the users and the aggregator engage in the following type of protocol: 1. A public random string S is chosen from some distribution S over support S.
Each user computes a message y
3. The aggregator A : Y n × S → Z computes some output z ← A(y 1 , . . . , y n , S).
Thus the protocol Π consists of the tuple Π = ((R 1 , . . . , R n ), A, S). We will sometimes write R to denote the local randomizers (R 1 , . . . , R n ). If R 1 = · · · = R n = R then we say the protocol is symmetric and denote it Π = (R, A, S).
Given user data x ∈ X n we will write Π( x) to denote the distribution of the protocol's output when the users' data is x, and R( x) denotes the distribution of the protocol's messages. Given a distribution P over X , we will write Π(P) and R(P) to denote the resulting distributions when x consists of n independent samples from P.
Informally, we say that the protocol satisfies local differential privacy [EGS03, DMNS06, KLN + 08] if the local randomizers depend only very weakly on their inputs. Formally, Definition 2.1 (Local DP [EGS03, DMNS06, KLN + 08]). A protocol Π = ((R 1 , . . . , R n ), A, S) satisfies (ε, δ)-local differential privacy if for every i ∈ [n], every x, x ∈ X , every S ∈ S and every Y ⊆ Y,
where we stress that the randomness is only over the coins of R i and not over the randomness of S. If δ = 0, then we will simply write ε-local differential privacy.
Threat Model: Manipulation Attacks
We capture manipulation attacks via a game involving a protocol Π = ( R, A, S), a vector x of n data values, and an adversary M . We parameterize the game by the number of users n and the number of corrupted users m ≤ n, written as Manip m,n ; when clear from context, the subscript is omitted. The crux of the game is that the adversary corrupts a set C of at most m users, then the users are assigned data x, and then either play honestly by sending the message y i = R i (x i , b) or they manipulate by playing some arbitrary message chosen by the adversary. Figure 2 presents the structure of an attack in the case where C = {1, 2}.
The game is described in Figure 4 , including a possible restriction on the attacker. We use Manip m,n (Π, x, M ) to denote the distribution on outputs of the protocol on data x and messages manipulated by M , and Manip m,n ( R, x, M ) to denote the distribution of messages in the protocol. Given a distribution P over X , we will use Manip m,n (Π, P, M ) and Manip m,n ( R, P, M ) to denote the resulting distributions when x consists of n independent samples from P.
Notational Conventions
Throughout, boldface roman letters indicate distributions (e.g. P). Vectors are denoted v = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . ). We write [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}. Rad(µ) will denote the distribution over {±1} with mean µ (e.g. Rad(0) is the standard Rademacher distribution).
Attacks Against Protocols for Binary Data
In this section, we show how to attack any protocol that estimates the mean of a Rademacher distribution Rad(µ). 2 In particular, we show that any such protocol has error Ω(m/εn + 1/ε √ n) in the presence of m corrupt users. The proof has two main steps. In the first, we argue that every ε differentially private protocol Π for binary data is equivalent with respect to manipulation to a protocol Π * where each user applies randomized response, building on [KOV15] . That is,
Elements: A protocol Π = ( R, A, S) for n users, a vector of data x, an attacker M .
1. Each user i is given data x i .
2. The public string S ∼ S is sampled.
3. The attacker M chooses a set of corrupted users C ⊆ [n] of size m.
If the corruptions are independent of the public string S then they are public-stringoblivious, and otherwise they are public-string-adaptive.
4. The attacker M chooses a set of messages {y i } i∈S for the corrupted users.
The non-corrupted users
6. The aggregator returns z ← A(y 1 , . . . , y n , b).
Figure 4: Manipulation Game Manip m,n
an attack against Π * implies an attack against Π. In the second step, we construct an attack against any randomized response protocol and show that it makes two distributions with distance ≈ m/εn + 1/ε √ n indistinguishable to the protocol.
Reduction to Randomized Response
This subsection will show that it is without loss of generality to design attacks for the family of ε-randomized response protocols, in which each user's randomizer is R RR ε (see (2) below) but the aggregator is arbitrary.
(2)
[KOV15] established that R RR ε dominates any other ε-private local randomizer for binary data; below, we present the result in a syntax more similar to that of [MV18] .
For a vector of randomizers R = (R i ) i∈[n] , we define the vector R * := (R * i ) i∈ [n] . Fix any ε-locally private protocol Π = ((R 1 , . . . , R n ), A) with data universe {±1} and message universe Y. We will use Π * to denote the symmetric protocol that uses randomizer R RR ε and aggregator A * R,A (see Algorithm 1). Lemma 3.1 directly implies that the transformation preserves any guarantees about the output (e.g. estimates of a Rademacher parameter will have the same error) in the absence of an attack:
Corollary 3.2. For any ε-locally private protocol Π = ((R 1 , . . . , R n ), A) for binary data and any mean µ ∈ [−1, +1], Π(Rad(µ)) and Π * (Rad(µ)) are identically distributed.
Now we claim that we can adapt an attack against Π * into one against Π, again preserving any guarantees about the output. Proof. Define M to be the attack that first executes M * to obtain a set of corrupt users C and their messages (
To ease the presentation of the proof, we assume without loss of generality that users are sorted so that the corrupted users C consist of the first m users. We use Y *
[m] to denote the distribution of (y
) to denote the distribution of (y i ) i∈ [m] . Below, each step equates distributions:
The second equality comes from Lemma 3.1. This concludes the proof.
The Attack on Randomized Response
In this section, we describe an attack against ε-randomzied response protocols. By Theorem 3.3, the statements we prove will generalize to arbitrary protocols. In particular, no protocol will be able to distinguish between (1) the scenario where there is no attack and data comes from Rad(µ) for a particular choice of mean p ≈ m εn + 1 ε √ n , and (2) the scenario where our attack is present and data comes from Rad(0). This will imply no protocol can estimate up to error p/2 in the presence of m corrupt users.
Choose C, the users to corrupt, by uniformly sampling from all subsets of [n] with size m Command each corrupted user i ∈ S to report y i ← +1. The attack M RR m,n is sketched in Figure 5 . To aid in the analysis, we define the functions µ(m, n) := m n + 2 ln 6 n and µ(m, n, ε) := e ε +1 e ε −1 · µ(m, n) = e ε +1 e ε −1 m n + 2 ln 6 n .
We will first show that M RR m,n will make the messages generated by R RR (Rad(0)) indistinguishable 3 from the messages generated by R RR (Rad(µ(m, n, ε))) (Lemma 3.4). Because the same aggregator will be run on both sets of messages, we show that the protocol's output is likewise indistinguishable (Corollary 3.6).
Lemma 3.4. For any n ≥ 931 and any m ≤ n/8,
Proof. We begin with the following observation: if we run R RR ε on a sample from Rad(q), then the output is drawn from Rad e ε −1 e ε +1 · q . If we choose q = µ(m, n, ε), the output of R RR ε on Rad(q) is drawn from Rad(µ(m, n)). Now consider the distribution R RR ε (Rad(µ(m, n, ε))). Because it is a symmetric distribution over {±1} nany permutation that the output takes is equally likely as any other permutation-it suffices to consider the number of bits with value +1. Let W + denote that number and observe that W + ∼ Bin(n, 1 2 + 1 2 µ(m, n)), where Bin(n, p) denotes the binomial distribution over [0, n] with expected value np.
If we choose q = 0, a message produced by R RR ε (Rad(q)) is drawn from Rad(0). Now consider the distribution Manip R RR ε , Rad(0), M RR m,n . Due to the random choice of corrupted users, this is a symmetric distribution over {±1} n so it suffices to consider W , the number of bits with value +1. There are n − m bits drawn from Rad(0) in addition to m bits that deterministically have value +1, so W ∼ Bin(n − m, 1 2 ) + m. In Appendix A, we prove the technical claim below:
Claim 3.5. For all n ≥ 931 and m ≤ n/8, if we sample W ∼ m + Bin(n − m, 1 2 ) and W + ∼ Bin n, 1 2 + m 2n + ln 6 2n , then for any W ⊆ [0, n],
This concludes the proof. 3 We remark our notion of indistinguishability is not an explicit bound on statistical distance, but instead a one-sided version of the differential privacy guarantee.
Corollary 3.6. For any n ≥ 931, any protocol Π = (RR ε , n, A), and any m ≤ n/8, the distribution Π(Rad(µ(m, n, ε))) cannot be distinguished from Manip Π, Rad(0), M RR m,n with arbitrarily low probability of failure. Specifically, if Z is the range of A, then for all Z ⊆ Z,
In the case where A is randomized, we invoke the property that A can be viewed as first sampling a deterministicÂ, then returningÂ( y). The distribution from whichÂ is drawn is independent of y.
Now we show that Corollary 3.6 implies a lower bound for Rademacher estimation.
Theorem 3.7. For any n ≥ 931, any ε-locally private Π = ((R 1 , . . . , R n ), A) that performs Rademacher estimation, and any m ≤ n/8, either
That is, either the protocol is inaccurate absent a manipulation attack or inaccurate under some manipulation attack.
Proof. By Corollary 3.2 and Theorem 3.3, it is without loss of generality to assume Π is an εrandomized response protocol. To reduce space, we will use shorthand α ← e ε +1 e ε −1 m 2n + ln 6 2n and p ← µ(m, n, ε).
We take the attack to be M RR m,n . If (5) is true, then the proof is complete. Otherwise, we will prove (4) under the premise that P Manip Π, Rad(0), M RR m,n ≥ α < 1/78. Observe that p = 2α.
< 77 78 (4) immediately follows from this upper bound. This concludes the proof.
Generalizing to Approximate Differential Privacy
For clarity of exposition, we have limited the analysis to protocols that satisfy pure differential privacy. Here, we generalize our attack to approximate differential privacy.
2x with probability δ
The randomized algorithm R RR ε,δ "fails at privacy" with probability δ: it reports an integer whose sign is the input x. Otherwise, it simply runs R RR ε .
Lemma 3.8 (From [KOV15] ). For any (ε, δ)-private randomizer R : {±1} → Y, there exists a randomized algorithm R * such that, for any x ∈ {±1}, R * (RR ε,δ (x)) and R(x).
From this lemma, we may construct (ε, δ) variants of A * R,A (Algorithm 1) and Π * . Hence, we obtain these generalizations of Corollary 3.2 and Theorem 3.3: Corollary 3.9. For any (ε, δ)-locally private protocol Π = ((R 1 , . . . , R n ), A) for binary data and any mean µ ∈ [−1, +1], Π(Rad(µ)) and Π * (Rad(µ)) are identically distributed. We finally argue that M RR m,n is effective against any (ε, δ) private randomized response protocol:
Lemma 3.11. For any n ≥ 931 and m ≤ n/8, the distribution
Proof. For our proof, we use F to denote the set of strings F that contain at least one failure integer:
This concludes the proof.
Attacks Against Protocols for Large Data Universes
In this section, we show that more powerful manipulation attacks are possible when the data universe is [d] for d > 2. For binary data, our attack showed that for any protocol there are two distributions U and P (i.e. Rad(0) and Rad(µ(m, n, ε)) with large statistical distance but are indistinguishable under manipulation. Specifically,
denotes 1 distance between the distributions d j=1 |U(j) − P(j)|. In this section, we show that there is an attack and a distribution such that U − P 1 = Ω d log n ( 1 ε √ n + m εn ) and U, P are indistinguishable under this attack. This construction implies lower bounds for uniformity testing (given samples from P, determine if P = U or if P − U 1 is large) and 1 estimation (given samples from P, report P such that P − P 1 is small).
Intuitively, our proof has the following structure. We show that, for every ε differentially private local randomizer R :
d multiplicative factor of one another. The size of H will be d/2 so U − U H 1 = 1/2. If a protocol Π could distinguish between U and U H then we would be able to create a protocol Π for binary data that distinguishes Rad(0) from Rad(1). Specifically, if x i = 1 then replace it with
there must be a manipulation attack that defeats it when m ≈ nε/ √ d. Our proof formalizes this intuition and generalizes it to the full range of m.
A Family of Data Distributions
In this section, we show a particular way to convert a Rademacher distribution into a distribution over [d] . For a given partition of [d] into H, H where |H| = d/2, we map the value +1 to a uniform element of H and −1 to a uniform element of H. Thus, when x ∼ Rad(µ), we obtain a corresponding random variablex over [d] whose distribution is P H,µ (see (7) below 
So for every choice of H, µ, and Π = ((R 1 , . . . , R n ), A), we can express each message from honest user i as the output of a randomizer Q H,R i that takes binary input. When these randomizers obey approximate differential privacy, Lemma 3.8 tells us that each randomizer can be decomposed into Choose H by uniformly sampling from all subsets of [d] with size d/2 Choose C, the users to corrupt, by uniformly sampling from all subsets of [n] with size m Command each corrupted user i ∈ S to report y i ∼ Q * H,R i (+1) Figure 6 : M Π m,n , an attack against protocol Π = ( R, A) for n users and data universe [d] two algorithms, the first being R RR ε,δ (see (6)). The second is a randomizer-dependent algorithm Q * H,R i . For brevity, we will use Q * H to denote the vector of all n of them. 
The Attack
In this subsection, we describe how m corrupted users can attack an arbitrary ε-private protocol Π = ((R 1 , . . . , R n ), A). This attack, denoted M Π m,n , is sketched in Figure 6 . The first step is to sample a uniformly random H. We show that if this H has the property that all Q H,R 1 , . . . , Q H,Rn all satisfy (ε , δ) differential privacy, then this attack inherits guarantees from the attack M RR m,n against RR ε ,δ . Then we show that this property holds with constant probability.
We begin the analysis of M Π m,n by considering its behavior conditioned on a fixed choice of H. This restricted form will be denoted M Π,H m,n . Then we will show that the random choice of H gives the desired lower bound.
Analysis for fixed set H
Here, we show that manipulating Π with M Π,H m,n induces the same distribution as if we had manipulated randomized response RR ε with M RR m,n : 
This concludes the proof. 
Proof. Recall the function µ(m, n, ε) = e ε +1 e ε −1 m n + 2 ln 6 n . We will set µ ← µ(m, n, ε). By Lemma 3.11, we have 
Analysis for randomized H
Here, we obtain a lower bound by analyzing randomness in H. We begin with a lemma that bounds the privacy parameters of all Q H,R i by an ε that depends on the structure of R: we will use | R| = to denote the number of unique randomizers in R.
There is a constant c such that, if d > c · (e 2ε − 1) 2 ln |Y| · | R| = and H is drawn uniformly from all subsets of [d] with size d/2, then the following holds with probability > 2/3 over the randomness of H: Every Q H,R i specified by Algorithm 2 is ε differentially private, where
We continue with a bound that only depends on n and not any particular structure in R:
There is a constant c such that, if d > c · (e 2ε − 1) 2 ln(e ε n) and H is drawn uniformly from all subsets of [d] with size d/2, then the following holds with probability > 2/3 over the randomness of H: Every Q H,R i specified by Algorithm 2 is (ε , 1/180n) differentially private, where
Proofs of these statements can be found in Appendix B. From Lemmas 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6, we have an attack that, with probability 2/3, successfully obscures a uniform distribution:
Lemma 4.7. Fix any n ≥ 931, any m ≤ n/8, any ε < 1, and any ε-locally private protocol Π = ( R, A) that accepts data from [d] . There are constants c 0 , c 1 and a value p ∈ [−1, +1] such that, for all H ⊂ [d] with size |H| = d/2,
ε ln min n, |Y| · | R| = · m n + 1 n but if d > c 0 · (e 2ε − 1) 2 ln min n, |Y| · | R| = , then the following holds with probability > 2/3 over the random choice of H in M Π m,n ( Figure 6 )
Applications to Testing and Estimation
From Lemma 4.7, we immediately derive a lower bound on how well the manipulation attack fares against uniformity testers:
Theorem 4.8. Fix any n ≥ 931, any m ≤ n/8, any ε < 1, and any ε-locally private protocol Π = ( R, A) for testing uniformity over [d] . There are constants c 0 , c 1 such that for all d > c 0 · (e 2ε − 1) 2 ln min n, |Y| · | R| = and all distributions P that satisfy
at least one of the following holds: n in 1 distance. We integrate these two results below:
Theorem 4.9. Fix any n ≥ 931, any m ≤ n/8, and any ε ∈ [−1, +1]. There exists constants c 0 , c 1 such that, for any ε-locally private protocol Π = ( R, A) that estimates distributions over [d] where d > c 0 · (e 2ε − 1) 2 ln min n, |Y| · | R| = , there exists a distribution P where at least one of the following holds:
Protocols with Nearly Optimal Robustness to Manipulation
In this section, we consider a number of well-studied problems in local privacy and identify specific protocols from the literature that have optimal robustness to manipulation (i.e. matching the lower bounds implied by our attacks). As discussed in the introduction, most of these problems can be cast as accurately estimating the mean of bounded vectors.
Warmup: Mean Estimation for Binary Data
As a warmup, we analyze the randomized response protocol in the presence of manipulation. Recall that the protocol is defined by the local randomized R RR ε and aggregator A RR n,ε as follows (where we have rescaled the messages to be an unbiased estimate of x, which is more convenient for analysis):
We bound the error of this protocol by O( 1 ε ( 1 √ n + m n ), which matches the lower bound of Theorem 3.7 up to constants.
Theorem 5.1. For any positive integers m ≤ n, any ε > 0, any x ∈ {0, 1} n , any manipulation adversary M , and any β > 0,
Proof. Consider an execution of Manip(RR ε,n , x, M ). Let C be the set of users corrupted by M , let y 1 , . . . , y n be the messages sent in the protocol and let y be the messages that would have been sent in an honest execution (so y i = y i for every i ∈ C). Let z = 1 n n i=1 y i be the output of the aggregator.
We can break up the error into two components, one corresponding to the error of the honest execution and one corresponding to the error introduced by manipulation.
x i honest execution
Since each message in the protocol is either e ε +1 e ε −1 or − e ε +1 e ε −1 , we have |y i − y i | ≤ 2 · e ε +1 e ε −1 . Thus, the manipulation term is bounded by e ε +1 e ε −1 · 2m n . For the error of the honest execution, note that E y i = x i and 1 n i∈[n] y i is an average of n independent random variables bounded to a range of width 2 · e ε +1 e ε −1 . Thus, by Hoeffding's inequality, we have that with probability at least 1 − β, the second term is bounded by e ε +1 e ε −1 2 ln(2/β) n with probability at least 1 − β.
Our analysis of richer protocols has the same structure. We construct the protocol so that each message y i gives an unbiased estimate of x i , and the aggregation computes the mean of the messages. We then isolate the effect of the manipulation from that of an honest execution. Finally, we have to bound the degree to which a set of m messages influences the output of the protocol. For richer protocols the analysis of the final step will become more involved.
Mean Estimation
We consider vector-valued data in R d . For any p ≥ 1, x p := ( d j=1 |x j | p ) 1/p denotes the standard p norm and B d p denotes the p unit ball in R d . As is standard x ∞ = max j∈[d] |x j | is the ∞ norm and B d ∞ is the ∞ unit ball. In this section, we study instances of the general p / q mean estimation problem: given data x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ B d p , output someμ such that μ − 1 n i x i q is as small as possible.
∞ / ∞ estimation (Counting Queries)
In this problem, each user has data x i ∈ B d ∞ and the goal is to obtain a vectorμ such that μ − 1 n x i ∞ is as small as possible. We consider the following protocol EST∞ = (R EST∞ , n, A EST∞ ), which is known to have optimal error absent manipulation.
1. Using public randomness, we partition users into d groups each of size n/d. Intuitively, we are assigning each group to one coordinate.
2. For each group j, each user i in group j reports the message y i ← R RR (x i,j ) 3. For each group j, the aggregator computes the average of the messages from group j to obtain µ j ≈ 1 n i x i,j . The aggregator reportsμ = (μ 1 , . . . ,μ d )
If the adversary's corruptions are oblivious to the public partition, then we show that there are ≈ m/d corrupt users in each group of size n/d. By our analysis of randomized response, the adversary can introduce at most ≈ m/d εn/d = m εn error in any single coordinate. Theorem 5.2. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), any positive integers m ≤ n, any x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ B d ∞ , and any public-string-oblivious adversary M , with probability ≥ 99/100, we have
Observe that the dependence on m matches that of the lower bound in Theorem 3.7 for Bernoulli estimation. We give the full details of the protocol in Appendix C.1.
1 / ∞ Estimation (Histograms)
In this problem, each user i has data x i ∈ B d 1 and the objective is aμ such that μ − 1 n n i=1 x i ∞ is as small as possible. To simplify the discussion, we focus on the special case where user i has data freq(1, x) ). The objective is a vectorμ such that μ − freq( x) ∞ is as small as possible.
We consider the following protocol HST, 4 , which is known to have optimal error absent manipulation: Proof Sketch. Identically to the proof of Theorem 5.1, we partition the error contributed by the honest and corrupt users. Let y be the messages sent in the protocol and let y be the messages that would have been sent in an honest execution.
To bound the error from the manipulation, note that messages have magnitude e ε +1 e ε −1 = Θ(1/ε). Hence, the bias introduced to any coordinate j is at most O(m/εn) with probability 1. sWe now bound the error introduced by the honest execution of the protocol. If x i = j, the expectation of y i s i,j is 1. Otherwise, the expectation is 0 because of pairwise independence. Hence, the honest execution has 0 expected error. Because messages have magnitude Θ(1/ε), Hoeffding's inequality and a union bound imply that no frequency estimate is more than O( log d/ε 2 n) from freq(j, x) with probability ≥ 99/100. This concludes the proof.
A slightly more general protocol can be used to obtain the same result for 1 / ∞ estimation.
Theorem 5.4. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), there is an ε-locally private protocol EST1 ε such that for any positive integer n, any x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ B d 1 , and any adversary M , with probability ≥ 99/100, we have
Observe that the manipulation error matches that of the lower bound in Theorem 3.7 for Bernoulli estimation. We give the full details of the protocol EST1 ε in Appendix C.2.
1 / 1 Estimation (Frequency Estimation)
In this problem, each user i has data x i ∈ B d 1 and the objective is aμ such that μ − 1 n n i=1 x i 1 is as small as possible. Because this problem and the 1 / ∞ problem have the same data type, we consider the same protocols but change the analysis to upper bound 1 error.
Theorem 5.5. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), any positive integer n, any x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ [d], and any adversary M , with probability ≥ 99/100, we have
Proof Sketch. Identically to the proof of Theorem 5.1, we partition the error contributed by the honest and corrupt users. Let y be the messages sent in the protocol and let y be the messages that would have been sent in an honest execution. Let S ∈ {±1} d×n be the matrix whose columns are s 1 , . . . , s n , and S C ∈ {±1} d×|C| be the submatrix consisting only columns corresponding to users i ∈ C.
To bound the error from the honest execution, observe that the expectation and variance are O( 1/ε 2 n) and O(1/εn), respectively, for any term in the outer sum. Hence, error has magnitude O( d 2 /ε 2 n) with probability ≥ 199/200.
To bound the error from the manipulation, we will use bounds on the singular values of the random matrix S C . As a shorthand, let c ε = e ε +1 e ε −1 . Then we have
where S C 2 denotes the largest singular value (operator norm) of S C . Since each matrix S C ∈ {±1} d×m is uniformly random, we can use strong bounds on the singular values of random matrices.
Lemma 5.6 (see e.g. the textbook [Tao12] ). For any k ∈ R + larger than an absolute constant and a matrix S C ∈ R d×m whose entries are sampled independently and identically, the following holds with probability ≥ 1 − exp(−k(d + m)) over the randomness of S C .
The adversary has n m ≤ exp(m ln n) choices of corruptions C. By a union bound over that set, we have with probability ≥ 1 − exp(m ln n − k(m + d))
The probability is ≥ 199/200 when k = O(ln n). A union bound over the manipulation and honest execution completes the proof.
A slightly more general protocol can be used to obtain the same result for 1 / 1 estimation.
Theorem 5.7. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), there is an ε-locally private protocol EST1 such that for any positive integer n, any x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ (B d 1 ) n , and any adversary M , with probability ≥ 99/100, we have
Observe that the manipulation error matches the lower bound in Theorem 4.9, up to a logarithmic factor.
2 / 2 Estimation
In this problem, each user i has data x i ∈ B d 2 and the objective is aμ such that μ − 1 n n i=1 x i 2 is as small as possible.
Consider the protocol EST2, 5 described below 1. For each user i, we sample s i ∈ R d uniformly at random from the surface of B d 2 .
2. Each user i computes w i ← sgn( s i · x i ) and then reports y i ← R RR ε (w i ) to the aggregator 3. The aggregator receives the messages y 1 , . . . , y n and outputs z ← c √ d n n i=1 y i s i for some absolute constant c.
Theorem 5.8. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), any positive integer n, any x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ B d 2 , and any adversary M , with probability ≥ 99/100, we have
Proof Sketch. Identically to the proof of Theorem 5.1, we partition the error contributed by the honest and corrupt users. Let S ∈ {±1} d×n be the matrix whose columns are s 1 , . . . , s n , and S C ∈ {±1} d×|C| be the submatrix consisting only columns corresponding to users i ∈ C.
A lemma from [DJW13b] implies that the error introduced by the honest execution of the protocol is O( d/ε 2 n) with probability ≥ 299/300.
To bound the error from the manipulation, we will again use bounds on the singular values of the random matrix S C . As a shorthand, let c ε = e ε +1 e ε −1 . Then we have 
We apply Lemma 5.6 then choose k = O(ln n) to bound S C 2 by O( √ d ln n + √ m ln n) with probability ≥ 299/300. A union bound completes the proof.
Observe that the manipulation error matches that of the lower bound in Theorem 3.7 for Bernoulli estimation up to a logarithmic factor.
Uniformity Testing
In this problem, each user has data x i ∈ [d] sampled from a distribution P. If P = U, then a protocol for this problem should output "uniform" with probability ≥ 99/100. If P − U 1 > α, then it should output "not uniform" with probability ≥ 99/100. Smaller values of α are desirable.
We consider the RAPTOR protocol, introduced by [ACFT19]. It divides users into G groups each of size n/G (where G is a parameter). In each group g, If there is someμ g 1 ε 2 n + m εn , the aggregator reports "not uniform." Otherwise, it reports "uniform."
Theorem 5.9. There is a choice of parameter G such that, for any ε ∈ (0, 1), any positive integers m ≤ n, and any adversary M , the following holds with probability ≥ 99/100 
Heavy Hitters
In this problem, each user has data x i ∈ [d]. The objective is to find a small subset L of the universe that contains every element j ∈ [d] such that freq j ( x) > α. Because there are 1/α heavy hitters, the size of L should be O(1/α).
We consider the protocol HH described in [BNST17] . 7 1. Sample public hash function h : [d] → [k] uniformly from a universal family (k d is a protocol parameter). Also sample π uniformly from partitions of [n] into groups of size n/ log 2 d. Intuitively, users in group g will communicate the g-th bit of their data value to the aggregator 2. Each user i in each group g:
(a) obtains bit(g, x i ), the g-th bit in the binary representation of x i .
(c) reports y i ← R HST (x i ) to the aggregator.
3. The aggregator iterates through each j ∈ [k] and constructs L j in the following manner: (a) Iterate through g ∈ log 2 d. At each step (j , g), gather the messages from group g then use A HST to obtain an approximate histogram over 2k. If the estimated frequency of 2 · j − 1 is larger than that of 2 · j , then set z j ,g ← 1 and otherwise z j ,g ← 0.
(b) L j ← the number represented in binary by z j ,1 , . . . , z j ,log 2 d 4. The aggregator reports L ← (L 1 , . . . , L k ) as heavy hitters
The size of L is at most k and the time spent by the aggregator to construct L is O(nk 2 log d) (from k log 2 d executions of A HST ). An upper bound on error under manipulation follows from Theorem 5.3, taking care to adjust the number of bins to 2k and the number of users to n/ log 2 d.
Theorem 5.10. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), any positive integers m ≤ n, any x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ [d] n , and any adversary M , if we execute L ← Manip m,n (HH ε , x, M ) with parameter k ← 300n 2 , then with probability ≥ 99/100, L contains all j such that freq j ( x) > α where
Proof Sketch. For any group g, let x (g) denote the data of users in group g. We first argue that three undesirable events occur with low probability.
• For some g, |freq( x) − freq( x (g) )| ∞ (log d)/n. By Hoeffding's inequality and a union bound over all groups, this happens with probability ≤ 1/300.
• Two data values that appear in x collide. Due to the size of k, this happens with probability ≤ 1/300.
• For some g, the error of the private histogram is too large. Specifically, there is a value α 0 ≈ (log d)·log(n log d) ε 2 n + m log d εn such that μ (g) − freq( x (g) ) ∞ > α 0 . From Theorem 5.3 and a union bound over all groups, this event happens with probability ≤ 1/300. The remainder of the proof sketch assumes these events have not occurred.
We fix any j ∈ [d] and any g ∈ [log 2 d]. We will argue that if j is a heavy hitter, then the aggregator will reconstruct the g-th bit of j. Let π(g) be the ordered set of users in group g and let x denote the vector (x i ) i∈π(g) .
Suppose freq(j, x) = τ . Because there are no collisions between hashes, it must be the case that freq(2h(j) − bit(g, j), x ) τ − (log d)/n and freq(2h(j) − 1 + bit(g, j), x ) = 0. The aggregator estimates these frequencies up to simultaneous error α 0 . So, when τ > α ≈ (log d)/n + 2α 0 , the estimate of freq(2h(j) − bit(g, j), x ) exceeds that of freq(2h(j) − 1 + bit(g, j), x ). This means the aggregator will assign z h(j),g ← bit(g, j).
We remark that the above sketch and analysis are for the simplest version of HH, in which k = O(n 2 ). In [BNST17] , the authors show that k = O(1/α) =Õ( √ n) suffices, achieving a smaller list and faster running time. We provide the full details of HH in Appendix C.4.
Suboptimal Protocols
In this section we demonstrate that there exist protocols with optimal error absent manipulation (m = 0) that perform quite poorly in the presence of manipulation (m > 0), thereby showing that a careful choice of protocols was necessary to achieve optimal robustness in Section 5.
Intuitively, the protocols in Section 5 achieve optimal robustness because they use public randomness to significantly constrain the choices of the corrupted users, and we argue that if we allow users to generate the randomness themselves, which has no effect on the protocol absent manipulation, then the protocol becomes much less robust.
We can sketch an example of this phenomenon for frequency estimation, although essentially the same phenomenon arises in all of the problems we study. Consider the following variant of the frequency estimation protocol:
1. Each user chooses a uniformly random vector s i ∈ {±1} d .
Each user samples
3. The aggregator outputsμ ← 1 n n i=1 y i .
One can verify that when all users follow the protocol honestly, the distribution of the outputμ is identical to that of the protocol HST ε . Therefore, when users are honest, with high probability we have μ − freq( x) 1 = O( d 2 /ε 2 n). However, because the adversary can have the corrupted users report arbitrary vectors in {± e ε +1 e ε −1 } d , and adversary who corrupts the first m users can introduce error on the order of In contrast, when we use the protocol HST ε , we were able to show that the adversary could only introduce error O( m √ d εn ).
[YB18] Min Ye and Alexander Barg. Optimal schemes for discrete distribution estimation under locally differential privacy. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 64(8):5662-5676, 2018.
A Proofs for Section 3
In this section, we prove the key technical claim from Section 3. Let p(m, n) = 1 2 + m 2n + 1 2n ln 6 p(m, n) ). For all n ≥ 931, m ≤ n/8, and 0 < k ≤ √ 2n ln 6,
Proof. We prove the claim by a direct calculation using the probability mass function of the binomial distribution. As shorthand, we use p = p(m, n).
where we introduce τ := 2 n−m · p (12)
As shorthands, we use b = 2e 4 7π 2 and c = ln 6 2 :
For any z ∈ (0, 1), recall that z − z 2 2 ≤ ln(1 + z) ≤ z for z ∈ (0, 1). Because our values of n, m, c ensure that 2c √ n n−m−2c √ n and 2k n−m both lie in the interval (0, 1), we upper bound terms (i), (ii) in (14).
In the case where k ≤ c √ n, the ratio 2c
n+m+2k is in (0, 1). Hence,
When c √ n < k ≤ 2c √ n, we note that (14,iii) is equivalent to 1 + 2k−2c
. The
The final inequality comes from the upper bound on k. Because (18) dominates (17), we will use it to form our upper bound. Taking (15), (16), (18) together, we have (14) , let R(U H ) denote the distribution over Y induced by samplingx from the uniform distribution over H and then executing R(x). In this notation, Q H,R is the algorithm which samples from R(U H ) when given +1, but samples from R(U H ) when given −1.
In this section, we provide two bounds on the privacy parameter ε of Q H,R when H is uniformly chosen. The first bound is O(ε (log(|Y| · | R| = ))/d) (Lemma B.5), where |Y| is the size of the message universe and | R| = is the number of unique randomizers. The second is O ε (log n)/d (Lemma B.8). We note that the second bound has no dependence on the specification of the randomizers, which may make it looser than the first bound.
The key to the analysis is to argue that, for most messages y and a uniformly random H, the log-odds ratio ln(P[R(U H ) = y]/P[R(U) = y]) is roughly ε/ √ d. To this end, we introduce the following definition: > v (20)
Next we show that when y is some fixed message and H is uniformly random, y is ≈ (ε/ √ d)-leaky with respect to H, R with low probability. 
For a uniformly random H, observe that each term in the numerator of (22) is a random variable that lies in the interval (e −ε max j P[R(j) = y], e ε max j P[R(j) = y]), due to the ε-privacy guarantee of R. We use the following version of Hoeffding's inequality for samples without replacement. Hoe63] ). Given a set p = {p 1 , . . . , p N } ∈ R N such that p i ∈ (c, c ), if the subset x = {x 1 , . . . , x n } is constructed by uniformly sampling without replacement from p, then
Hence, the following is true with probability 1 − β/2:
By a completely symmetric argument, the following holds with probability 1 − β/2:
(24) follows from the condition that d > 4(e 2ε − 1) 2 ln 2 β . (21) follows from (23) and (24) (through a union bound). This concludes the proof. Now we apply Claim B.2 to analyze the privacy of any Q H,R i .
B.1 A protocol-dependent bound on ε
Our first bound on the privacy parameters will be dependent on the structure of the initial randomizers R 1 , . . . , R n from which the new randomizers Q H,R 1 , . . . , Q H,Rn are derived. We use |Y| to denote the size of the message universe and | R| = to denote the number of unique randomizers.
The following is immediate from Claim B.2 by applying a union bound over all the unique randomizers in R and the message universe Y:
Below, we use [d] d/2 as shorthand for the subsets of [d] with size d/2. We bound the expectation of the random variable:
Markov's inequality implies that (26) holds with probability ≥ 1 − 1/6n.
(25) is a bound on the probability that R i (U) is leaky. Because R satisfies differential privacy, (25) implies a bound on the probability that R i (U H ) is leaky.
Corollary B.7. Fix any ε > 0, any β ∈ (0, 1), any d > 4(e 2ε − 1) 2 ln 2 β , and any n algorithms R 1 . . . R n that are ε-private. If H is sampled uniformly from subsets of [d] with size d/2, then the following holds with probability ≥ 5/6 over the randomness of H:
The algorithm Q H,R i reports either a sample from R i (U H ) or from R i (U H ). Having bounded the probability that either sample is leaky, we can now argue that Q H,R i satisfies approximate differential privacy.
Lemma B.8. Fix any ε > 0, any δ, β ∈ (0, 1), any d > 4(e 2ε −1) 2 ln(12e ε n/δ), and any n algorithms that are ε-private. If H is sampled uniformly from subsets of [d] with size d/2, then the following holds with probability > 2/3 over the randomness of H: all randomizers {Q H,R i } i∈[n] specified by Algorithm 2 satisfy (ε , δ)-privacy, where ε = (e 2ε − 1) 16 d ln(24e ε n/δ).
Proof. Define β = δ/(12e ε n) so that ε = (e 2ε − 1) 16 d ln(2/β). For every Y ⊆ Y, the following holds with probability > 5/6 by Corollary B.7.
We take identical steps to show that the following holds with probability > 5/6 as well:
From basic composition and a union bound, the following holds with probability > 2/3:
Recall that Q H,R i samples from R i (U H ) on input +1 and from R i (U H ) on input −1. Hence, Q H,R i satisfies ε , δ privacy. This concludes the proof.
C Construction and Analysis of Protocols from Section 5 C.1 Construction and Analysis of EST∞
The protocol EST∞ n,d,ε consists of the n randomizers (R EST∞ n,d,ε,i ) i∈[n] and the aggregator A EST∞ n,d,ε ; see Algorithms 3 and 4 for the pseudocode. A public partition of [n] into d groups, denoted π, is drawn uniformly. An important subroutine is described by (27). It samples from ±1 in such a way that the mean is equal to the jth coordinate of user data x i .
The following statement is a version of Theorem 5.2 that allows for arbitrary failure probability.
Theorem C.1. For any β ∈ (0, 1), there is a constant c such that, for any ε > 0, any positive integers m ≤ n, any x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ B d ∞ , and any attacker M oblivious to public randomness:
When we apply randomized response to data encoded by Encode ∞ , we can obtain our third bound on error immediately from Theorem 5.1:
Claim C.5. For any m ≤ n/d, any x ∈ {±1} n/d and any attacker M , RR ε/2,n/d has the following guarantee on estimation error after playing the (m , n/d)-manipulation game: 
There is a constant c such that, for any β ∈ (0, 1), any ε > 0, any positive integers n, d, and any x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ [d] n , with probability ≥ 1 − β, we have
To prove the theorem, we bound the error introduced by (1, x) , . . . , freq(d, x) ).
Claim C.7. There is a constant c such that for any positive integers n, d and any x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ B d 1 , if we sample x i ← Encode d 1 (x i ) for each user i, then P max
Proof. Consider any user data x i ∈ B d 1 and any coordinate j ∈ [d]. Without loss of generality, we will assume that x i,j > 0. By construction, P[x i = 2j − 1] = x i and P[x i = 2j] = 0. Hence,
The random variable 1[x i = 2j − 1] − 1[x i = 2j] − x i,j ranges from −2 to +2. By a Hoeffding bound, the following holds with probability ≥ 1 − β/d. 
Proof. To prove this claim, we fix a value j ∈ [2d + 1] and argue that the estimate of freq(j , x ) has error c · e ε +1 e ε −1 · 1 n ln d β with probability 1 − β/(2d + 1). A union bound over all j ∈ [2d + 1] will complete the proof.
Recall that all y i have magnitude e ε +1 e ε −1 . By a Hoeffding bound, the following holds with probability ≥ 1 − β/(2d + 1) (where we use s(j ) to denote the vector (s 1,j , . . . , s n,j ):
It remains to show that z j is unbiased:
We also formalize the argument that m users cannot manipulate the protocol beyond O(m/εn):
Theorem C.9. There is a constant c such that, for any β ∈ (0, 1), any ε > 0, any positive integers m, n, d, any attacker M , and any x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ [d] n , with probability ≥ 1 − β, we have
Proof. As sketched in Section 5, we bound the error from the honest execution separately from the error from the manipulation. Given that Theorem C.6 already bounds the honest execution, it will suffice to prove that
By construction, both the manipulative messages y i and the honest messages y i are members of the set {± e ε +1 e ε −1 }. There are m corrupt users in C. Hence, the bound follows.
C.2.2 Error in 1
Theorem C.10. There is a constant c such that, for any β ∈ (0, 1), any ε > 0, any positive integers n, d, and any x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ [d] n , with probability ≥ 1 − β, we have
To prove the theorem, we bound the error introduced by Encode d ∞ and by R RR ε separately. Claim C.11. There is a constant c such that for any positive integers n, d and any x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ B d 1 , if we sample x i ← Encode d 1 (x i ) for each user i, then the following holds with probability ≥ 1 − β:
Observe that E[err (i, j)] = 0 and |err (i, j)| ≤ 2. By Hoeffding's inequality, the quantity 1 n n i=1 err (i, j) is subgaussian. Specifically, for all t > 0,
Note that this implies there are constants c 0 , c 1 such that
For shorthand, we define err (j) := 1 n n i=1 err (i, j) ≤ 2. Observe that the left-hand side of (28) is equivalent to d j=1 err (j). From (30), (30), and a Chernoff bound, the sum tightly concentrated around its expectation: z j − freq(j , x ) ≤ c · e ε + 1 e ε − 1 · d 2 n log 1 β
Proof. Define the random variable err (i, j ) := y i s i,j − 1[x i = j ]. The same steps taken in the proof of Claim C.11 apply here, except now |err (i, j )| ≤ 2 · e ε +1 e ε −1 .
C.3 Construction and Analysis of RAPTOR
The protocol RAPTOR n,G,ε consists of G randomizers: user i is assigned randomizer i/G . Public randomness will generate S 1 , . . . , S G each of which are uniformly random subsets of [d] of size d/2. If a user runs the g-th randomizer, they will privately report whether or not their data lies in S g . The aggregator performs a threshold test on each group.
We reproduce the randomizer and aggregator pseudocode in Algorithms 8 and 9. For the sake of this proof, we use 1 ± [bool ] to denote the indicator function that evaluates to +1 when bool is true and −1 when it false. Algorithm 9: A RAPTOR n,G,ε , an aggregation algorithm for uniformity testing Parameters: Positive integers n, G; privacy parameter ε Input: y 1 , . . . y n ∈ {± e ε +1 e ε −1 } n ; public sets S 1 , . . . , S G Output: The string "Uniform" or the string "Not Uniform" α G := e ε +1 e ε −1 · 6G n ln 4G β + 2mG n For g ∈ [G] start(g) ← 1 + (g − 1) · n/G end (g) ← g · n/G /* Estimate of probability mass in S g */ p(S g ) ← G n end(g) i=start(g) y i If |p(S g )| > 2α G :
Return "Not uniform"
Return "Uniform"
We rely on the following technical lemma concerning uniformly random S: The following statement is a version of Theorem 5.9 that allows for arbitrary failure probability β.
Theorem. There is a constant c and a choice of parameter G = Θ(log 1/β) such that, for any ε > 0, any positive integers m ≤ n, and any attacker M , the following holds with probability ≥ 1 − β Manip m,n (RAPTOR n,G,ε , U, M ) = "uniform" and, when P − U 1 ≥ c · e ε +1 e ε −1 · dG n ln G β + mG √ d n , the following also holds with probability ≥ 1 − β Manip m,n (RAPTOR n,G,ε , P, M ) = "not uniform"
Proof. We specify the following undesirable events:
If P = U and neither E 1 nor E 2 have occurred, everyp(S g ) is at most 2α G . Thus, the output is "Uniform."
If P − U 1 ≥ α G · √ 160d and none of E 1 , E 2 , E 3 have occurred, somep(S g ) has magnitude at least 2α G . Thus, the output is "Not uniform." 
C.4 Construction and Analysis of HH
The protocol HH n,d,k,ε consists of the n randomizers (R HH n,d,k,ε,i ) i∈[n] and the aggregator A HH n,d,k,ε ; see Algorithms 11 and 12 for the pseudocode. A public data structure π partitions [n] into log 2 d groups uniformly at random. We assume the data structure has an implicit order within each group π(1), . . . , π(log 2 d). The public hash function h : [d] → [k] is drawn uniformly. To facilitate the use of EST1, we also sample vectors s 1 , . . . , s n uniformly from {±1} 2k .
Algorithm 10: OneHotHash h,k (g, x i ) /* One-hot vector that encodes a hashed value */ x i ← (0, . . . , 0 Return L Theorem C.15. There is a constant c such that, for any ε > 0, any positive integers m ≤ n, any x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ [d] n , and any adversary M , if we execute L ← Manip m,n (HH n,k,ε , x, M ) with parameter k ← 3n 2 /β, then with probability ≥ 1 − β, L contains all j such that freq(j, x) > c · e ε + 1 e ε − 1 · log d n log n log d β + m log d n As discussed in Section 5.4, there are three undesirable events that can occur when the game is played. in three separate claims below, we state them formally and bound the probability of each event by β/3. We first consider the event that the frequency of any j ∈ x is significantly different from the frequency of j ∈ x (g) :
Claim C.16. Fix any x ∈ [d] n . There is a constant c such that, when π is a uniformly random partition of [n] into groups π(1), . . . , π(log 2 d) each of size n/ log 2 d, P ∀j ∈ x ∀g ∈ [log 2 d] |freq(j, x) − freq(j, x (g) )| > c · log 2 d n ln n · log 2 d β ≤ β/3 This is proven via a Hoeffding bound and a union bound. Next we argue that there are likely no collisions: ≤ n 2 · P[h(x 2 ) = h(x 1 )] = n 2 k < β/3
A core part of the protocol is, for each group g, the execution of EST1 n ,2k,ε on one-hot encodings (x i ) i∈π(g) . Theorem C.9 implies the following:
Claim C.18. Fix any m < n , x ∈ (B 2k 1 ) n , any adversary M against EST1 n ,2k,ε , and any β ∈ (0, 1). There exists a constant c such that P Manip m,n (EST1 n ,2k,ε , x , M ) −
We are now ready to prove Theorem C.15
Proof of Theorem C.15. Let c 0 , c 1 be the constants from Claims C.16 and C.18, respectively. We will prove that with probability ≥ 1 − β, for each g ∈ [log 2 d] and for each j such that freq(j, x) > c 0 · log 2 d n ln n · log 2 d β + 2c 1 · e ε + 1 e ε − 1 · 1 n ln k log 2 d β + m n (32)
